This paper will critically compare the precepts of autonomy (qāʿida salṭana/tasālut) and ‘lack of harm’ (qāʿida lā ḍarar): part one will present the traditional discussion on the meaning and remit of each precept, and part two will examine the areas of conflict between the precepts and propose resolutions to the conflict.
The discussions will appreciate the precepts in their existential capacity, which will aid reconciliation within the areas of conflict.
The sources used in referencing this article are predominantly books written specifically on the judicial precepts that are being read and taught within the seminaries of Najaf and Qum. Occasionally references are provided from books of uṣūl and fiqh wherein the precepts are discussed within either their applicative remit or a broader context.
The paper is written for a specialist audience and hence technical terms of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh are used with the assumption that the reader understands them in their precise technical context. This is also assumed with regard to certain jurisprudential and philosophical concepts that are required in treatment of the subject. Certain themes that are not central to the subject yet form a part of the overall treatment of the subject are mentioned in passing in order to not lengthen the paper unduly.Request Article